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Humans can consolidate and carry out
habits other animals cannot. This state-
ment is mainly sustained by the fact that
humans have a unique cognitive control of
their actions: we can let our attention fade
away to perform automatic tasksmore effi-
ciently, we can detect if there has been
an unexpected problem in their imple-
mentation, and we can regain conscious
control of the action if necessary. We tend
to dichotomize this cognitive process into
two “systems,” namely goal-directed ver-
sus habitual (Dickinson, 1985), conscious
versus unconscious (Crick and Koch,
1998), or slow versus fast (Kahneman,
2011). If we just put it in those terms,
these two ways of tackling the challenges
of a changing environment seem to be
present in non-human animals. However,
all dichotomies imply a difficulty to deal
with: the regulation of the transition
between the two systems. Is this carried
out by a third element, or regulated by
one of the systems? Could it be more con-
venient to view it as a continuum, rather
than a dichotomy? In any case, we believe
this transition has a level of complexity
in humans that makes it qualitatively dif-
ferent from its analog in animals. In fact,
this “cognitive bridge” might be a major
feature to characterize a reliable behav-
ior, since a particular task or problem is
more efficiently tackled when the transi-
tion between the two systems is more ade-
quate. Moreover, the integrity of this link
could be an indicator to detect prodro-
mal psychiatric conditions, as it has been
suggested for slips-of-action (Gillan et al.,
2011).
In order to justify these ideas, we
will focus first on Kahneman’s distinc-
tion between systems 1 and 2 (Kahneman,
2011). On the one hand, System 1 is
responsible for making decisions rapidly.
The purpose of this system is to give us an
assessment of the environment around us
as quickly as possible so that we are able
to respond as fast as possible. To perform
this task, System 1 follows general rules
or guidelines (heuristics). In all, System
1 is intended to help us make decisions
more quickly, and is very useful (let’s say
“just fine”) in most cases. However, one of
the characteristics of these decisions is the
lack of voluntary control, what is a prob-
lem considering this system is responsible
of many of the decisions and judgments
we make. Given to its “automatic” nature,
System 1 also has biases and systematic
errors that are likely to happen in some
situations.
On the other hand, System 2 acts when
a problem which System 1 has no solution
for arises. System 2, apparently, can take
control of the whole process at any time.
It is somewhat triggered by some external
or internal alarm that draws its attention
and makes it take “conscious” control of
the situation. One of the problems of this
system is that it is lazy and can be easily
exhausted. Therefore, it usually accepts the
decisions of System 1 without monitoring
them. One proof of System 2’s negligence
is what Kahneman calls WYSIATI (“What
You See Is All There Is”), a general rule that
“facilitates the achievement of coherence
and of the cognitive ease that causes us to
accept a statement as true.” System 1 easily
gets that coherence, and System 2 usually
allows it to jump to conclusions and act. In
different sets of experiments, Kahneman
demonstrates that humans are not good at
all with statistics or handling mathemat-
ics; in his opinion, this is because humans
simplify judgments to make them more
understandable and deal with them just
through heuristics that System 1 can han-
dle. This general view of humans as poor
rational decision-makers is also supported
by other authors (see, for example, Ariely,
2008).
In our opinion, this division of
human cognition into two systems
fits well with the usual opposition
between goal-directed versus habitual
systems (Dickinson, 1985). In general,
goal-directed actions are viewed as con-
scious, flexible, and sensitive to outcome
devaluation, whereas habits are mainly
unconscious, rigid and insensitive to
changes in the value of the outcome. The
features of goal-directed and habit systems
were mainly drawn from studies in ani-
mals. The typical experiment about this
subject consists on teaching the contin-
gency between an instrumental action (for
example, a lever press) and a reward to the
animal (Adams and Dickinson, 1981).
At the beginning, the animal’s behav-
ior is goal directed, and it performs the
action to obtain the reward. However,
this behavior becomes “habitual” (in this
context, a motor routine) after many rep-
etitions. When that happens, the value
of the reward is transferred to the lever
press itself: even though the outcome is
devalued (gets the animal sick) or the ani-
mal is sated, it keeps pressing the lever.
This is why habits have been opposed to
goal-directed behavior.
A quick look suggests that habits and
goal-directed actions are intimately related
to Systems 1 and 2, respectively. This is
also supported by the identification of the
goal-directed system with a model-based
reinforcement learning scheme, since it
can be viewed “in terms of sophisticated,
computationally demanding, prospective
planning, in which a decision tree of
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possible future states and actions is built
using a learned internal model of the
environment” (Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
The habitual system, on the other hand,
follows a model-free scheme, which “is
computationally efficient, since it replaces
computation (i.e., the burdensome sim-
ulation of future states) with memory
(i.e., stored discounted values of expected
future reward); however, the forward-
looking nature of the prediction error
makes it statistically inefficient” (Dolan
and Dayan, 2013). Following these analo-
gies between systems, we can assume that
some actions that at the beginning fall
under the domain of System 2 might be
transferred to System 1 through learning,
like goal-directed actions become habits
through experience.
Concerning the neural bases of these
systems, the striatum and its cortical affer-
ents and –indirect– target areas in the cor-
tex play a major role. It is widely accepted
that the cognitive part of the striatum
–caudate nucleus and anterior putamen–
are involved in the planning and execution
of goal-directed actions, together with the
prefrontal cortex (Balleine et al., 2007). On
the other hand, the sensorimotor striatal
aspects –mainly the posterior putamen–
and the supplementary motor area of the
cortex are particularly active when the
agent is performing a well-learned action
(Miyachi et al., 2002; Ashby et al., 2010).
Furthermore, the activity of the neurons
in these areas follows a “chunked” pat-
tern: they are mainly active at certain
stages of the motor routine (for exam-
ple at the beginning and the end of the
sequence, when a particular switch or
turn is needed, etc), and this activity is
reduced in the rest of the motor sequence
(Graybiel, 1998). Although some authors
question a sharp neuroanatomical basis of
Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2 (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007), our train of thought in
this manuscript suggests that the more
reflective System 2 should be based in
the prefrontal cortex –both dorsal and
ventral–, and the cognitive regions of the
basal ganglia. Likewise, the more auto-
matic System 1 would lie on motor and
premotor cortical regions, as well as on the
sensorimotor aspects of those subcortical
nuclei.
This neuroscientific framework identi-
fies the habit system with automaticity,
rigidity and unconsciousness; however,
we are intending to challenge this view
in past and forthcoming contributions
(Bernacer and Gimenez-Amaya, 2013;
Bernacer et al., 2014). In a nutshell, we
propose to view the phenomenon of action
from the point of view of the agent as a
whole, and not from an isolated move-
ment. Hence, it could be more convenient
to understand System 1 –or habits– as a
resource of System 2, rather than as
opposed systems in competition. Whereas
a motor routine (i.e., what is commonly
called “habit” in neuroscience) implies
the sequential and unconscious perfor-
mance of movements, they usually pursue
the goal set by the agent. In fact, the more
engrained the routine is, the easier for the
agent to achieve that goal. Furthermore,
the agent can consciously stop or correct
the movement at any point, since the habit
releases the higher cognitive regions of the
brain to improve the performance of the
action. A very simple example of this is
a tennis service, which should be “goal
directed” to place the ball wherever the
player wants. It involves a set of move-
ments such as throwing the ball upwards,
moving the feet, putting the arm back,
etc. Only when these motor routines are
learned correctly, the player is able to con-
centrate on other aspects of the service
such as the speed, spin, or exploiting the
weaknesses of the receiver. This can be
also exemplified with other kinds of habits
such as driving, playing an instrument,
tackling a mathematical problem, and so
on. They all suggest that “automatic” rou-
tines are governed by higher cognitive
functions to better achieve a particular
goal.
Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2 allow as
well this release of consciousness from
everyday decisions to focus on more com-
plicated situations. As Kahneman himself
and other authors defend (Ariely, 2008),
the problem arises when System 2 is rarely
used or either system is applied to inade-
quate situations. However, we believe that
the most effective agent does not exclu-
sively rely on System 2, but efficiently
uses all resources of “each system” in the
right situation and, more importantly, car-
ries out an appropriate transition between
them. That is, in our opinion, a “rational”
agent. This could be also said about goal-
directed and habitual systems. Moreover,
we believe that this transition between sys-
tems is subject to learning, and it can
be performed more effectively through
experience.
If we understand these fragmentations
of cognition as independent systems in
competition, we encounter an important
problem: is there an additional mecha-
nism in charge of the transition between
systems, or is this regulated by one of
the systems itself? If the first option were
true, we would find the difficulty of defin-
ing the nature –both conceptually and
anatomically– of a “third system” quali-
tatively different than the other two. This
would lead us to an ad infinitum pro-
cess –the need of a fourth element to
regulate the activity of the third, and so
on–, and therefore we believe this hypoth-
esis should be rejected. Considering the
second option, it seems that only the
highly cognitive System 2 could be in
charge of leading the transition between
systems, which in turn dissolves a rigor-
ous separation in two systems. The role
of System 2 in leading the transition is
clear when the agent decides to regain
conscious control of a task generally per-
formed in an unconscious manner. In this
sense, the interaction of the orbitofrontal
cortex with either the cognitive or sensori-
motor aspects of the striatum plays a cen-
tral role in shifting between goal-directed
actions and motor routines (Gremel and
Costa, 2013). In other situations, an exter-
nal cue such as an error may set the
alarm for System 2 to retake control of the
action. Regarding this, the anterior cingu-
late cortex has been reported to be active
in highly-conflictive decision making situ-
ations (Goñi et al., 2011); for that reason,
some authors relate this cortical area with
error monitoring (Carter, 1998; Botvinick
et al., 2004). A recent report suggests a
new model of reinforcement learning and
conflict monitoring, which involves a wide
network including different areas of the
cortex (posterior parietal, precentral, ante-
rior cingulate and prefrontal) and the basal
ganglia (Zendehrouh et al., 2013).
To sum up, this opinion article suggests
viewing Kahneman’s systems as analogous
to the goal-directed/habits dichotomy in
order to improve the understanding of
some aspects of human cognition. Further,
we believe a strict separation between sys-
tems in competition is problematic, since
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System 2 is always in charge of governing
the interplay between systems: therefore,
System 1 –or habits– should be under-
stood as a resource of System 2. This view
could shed some light on the understand-
ing of habits as a source of learning, plas-
ticity and freedom for the agent. Finally, an
inappropriate cognitive control of habits
could be an indicator of certain psychiatric
conditions.
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